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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Consanguineous marriage, or marriage between close biological relatives, is a social institution that
is, or has been, common throughout human history (Bittles, 1994, Bittles et al., 1993, and Hussain
and Bittles, 2000). Although in the western world consanguineous marriages constitute less than
1 percent of total marriages, this practice has enjoyed widespread popularity in North Africa, the
Middle East and South Asia (Maian and Mushtaq, 1994; Bittles 2001).1 In Iraq for example,
46.4 percent of marriages are between ﬁrst or second cousins (Al-Hamamy et al, 1986; Al-Hamamy
and Al-Hakkak, 1989; also reported in the New York Times, September 23, 2003). In India, data
from the 1992-93 National Family Health Survey show that consanguineous marriages constitute
16 percent of all marriages, but this varies from 6 percent in the north to 36 percent in the south
(IIPS and ORC Macro International, 1995, Banerjee and Roy, 2002). More widely, evidence from
South Asia suggests that consanguineous marriage occurs in rural areas (Rao and Inbaraj, 1977, and
Reddy, 1993), irrespective of religious groups and economic classes (Bittles 2001, and Iyer, 2002).
Scientiﬁc research in clinical genetics documents a negative eﬀect of inbreeding on the health and
mortality of human populations, and the incidence of disorders and disease among the oﬀspring
of consanguineous unions (Bittles, 2001). But a key gap in all these studies is that the economic
dimensions of the prevalence of consanguineous marriage are comparatively unexplored.
It is in this setting that this paper makes its contribution: to postulate that consanguinity is
a response to a marriage market failure in developing countries, rather than simply a consequence
of culture, religion or preferences. The starting point of our analysis are the following two stylized
facts commonly observed in large parts of South Asia and elsewhere. On the one hand, marriage
celebrations are often associated with monetary transfers between families. If such transactions take
place early on rather than at later stages in marital life, it suggests that they might be a response to
time-inconsistent behavior on the part of one of the individuals or families involved in the marriage
contract. On the other hand, as brieﬂy discussed previously, consanguineous marriages can be a
very widespread practice in some communities. This prompts us to wonder what the beneﬁts of
marrying close kin are. The presumption that informal enforcement mechanisms are more likely to
be available to relatives induces us to think that consanguinity mitigates the costs associated with
incomplete contracts.
This paper is an attempt to elucidate these two issues in both theoretical and empirical contexts.
We reconcile the existence of dowries and the prevalence of consanguinity in marriages within a
single theoretical framework. When the marriage market is characterized by positive assortative
mating, each party wants to commit ex-ante to largely contribute to household production as this
will result in an increase in the value of the match. However, once links have formed and are costly
to sever, one family holds the other up, and may now prefer to invest in alternative opportunities,
while free-riding on in-laws’ investments. To overcome this time-inconsistency, ex-ante transfers
1Although this practice enjoyed widespread popularity in Europe, the genetic implications of this practice was
often derided in other continents: for example, on 5 March 1810 in a letter to the Governor of New Hampshire John
Langdon, Thomas Jeﬀerson wrote, ‘The practice of Kings marrying only in the families of Kings, has been that of
Europe for some centuries. Now, take any race of animals, conﬁne them in idleness and inaction, whether in a stye, a
stable or a state-room, pamper them with high diet, gratify all their sexual appetites, immerse them in sensualities,
nourish their passions, let everything bend before them, and banish whatever might lead them to think, and in a few
generations they become all body and no mind; and this, too, by a law of nature, by that very law by which we are
in the constant practice of changing the characters and propensities of the animals we raise for our own purposes.
Such is the regimen in raising Kings, and in this way they have gone on for centuries.’ (Bergh, 1907). For further
information on consanguinity in earlier European generations, see Bittles and Egerbladh (2005).
2between families are hence viewed as the renunciation of ownership rights over assets in order to
make investment commitments credible. We thus view marriage as joint production between two
families with a transfer of control rights to the family with the highest incentives to invest. In
our context, we postulate the commitment problem to be on the bride’s side, so that monetary
transfers correspond to dowries. To this aspect, we add two extra features. First, the extent to
which agents are time-inconsistent depends negatively on how closely related partners are. Between
cousins, ex-ante commitments are more credible, arguably because informal contracts are easier to
enforce within the extended family. Conversely, when spouses are further apart, the role of the
dowry is crucial as it becomes easier to renege on a contract. Thus, close-kin marriages require
smaller dowry payments. Second, dowries are costly, as they imply borrowing on the credit market
in order to make payments at the time of marriage. Our model then predicts that consanguinity
and dowries are substitutes as instruments to overcome or to mitigate the aforementioned time-
inconsistency problem. The relative use of these two devices will depend on the associated costs.
When marrying close kin, families forgo the beneﬁts of gene diversiﬁc a t i o n ,r i s kh e d g i n g ,o rs o c i a l
network integration. On the other hand, costly dowry transfers are lost, hence not invested.
We test our predictions using data on 4,364 households from the 1996 Matlab Health and Socio-
economic Survey, conducted in 141 villages in Bangladesh. We ﬁnd that women in consanguineous
unions are, on average, 6-7 percent less likely to bring a dowry at marriage, after controlling for other
attributes at the time of marriage, suggesting that consanguinity and dowry are substitutes. Looking
at the eﬀects of credit constraints on the prevalence of consanguineous marriages, we observe a neg-
ative relationship between cousin marriage and parental socio-economic status. An alternative test
consists of examining the relationship between consanguinity and the age at marriage. Admittedly,
if women and men are married at earlier ages, their respective families have then less time to accu-
mulate assets, exposing themselves to more stringent credit constraints. Our results lend support
to this argument. We ﬁnd that a one-year higher age at marriage increases the value of a dowry
by nearly 50 percent, while decreasing the likelihood of consanguineous marriage by approximately
3 percent.
In depicting a negative correlation between consanguinity and the payment of a dowry at the time
of marriage, our ﬁndings are entirely consistent with existing sociological and demographic studies
conducted on this issue (Centerwall and Centerwall 1966; Reddy 1993). Furthermore, our paper
adheres to the economics literature on marriage markets in developing countries. It shares with
Peters and Siow (2002) the property that an increase in spousal investment commitment increases
the quality of the match. However, our analysis does not focus on pre-marital investments but on the
time-inconsistency problem associated with the inability to pre-commit to a given course of action.
Bloch and Rao (2002) and Jacoby and Mansuri (2006) models are, in that respect, germane to ours.
In Bloch and Rao (2002), husbands cannot commit to reveal their true satisfaction once married, so
that violence becomes a credible signal of dissatisfaction, a trigger of compensation on the part of the
bride’s family. Jacoby and Mansuri (2006) argue that the custom of watta-satta in rural Pakistan
addresses yet another contracting problem: by marrying each other’s sister, two husbands expose
themselves to retaliation on their sisters, in the event of domestic abuse on their part. This then
constitutes a credible commitment to non-violence. Closer to our approach as it deals with wealth
and investment rather than domestic violence, Botticini and Siow (2003) explicitly take the view
that dowries address an inter-generational time-inconsistency problem: before marriage, daughters
cannot commit to manage parental assets as eﬃciently as their male siblings once they get married,
inducing altruistic parents to provide dowries for their daughters, while leaving bequests to sons.
We instead model an inter-familial principal-agent problem, in which grooms’ families are principals
3and brides’ families are agents. Becker (1981) gives an alternative rationale underlying the existence
of dowries and bride prices. He views these transfers as ex-ante compensations for ex-post loss of
bargaining power. Building on this theory, Zhang and Chan (1999) argue that dowries have the
exclusive property of increasing a wife’s bargaining power by raising her threat point. This view
however does not explain why such transfers should be taking place at the time of marriage, rather
than later on during married life. Moreover, all of these papers remain entirely silent on the subject
of consanguineous marriage.
The social science literature on dowries far exceeds that on consanguineous marriages. To par-
tially oﬀset this imbalance, we review important facts and ﬁndings related to consanguinity in Section
2. We present our model in Section 3, and Section 4 uses data from Bangladesh to test the main
predictions of the theory. Section 5 concludes.
2 Consanguineous Marriages
In the ﬁeld of clinical genetics, a consanguineous marriage is deﬁned as “a union between a couple
related as second cousins or closer, equivalent to a coeﬃcient of inbreeding in their progeny of
F ≥ 0.0156” (Bittles, 2001).2 This means that children of such marriages are predicted to inherit
copies of identical genes from each parent, which are 1.56 percent of all gene loci over and above
the baseline level of homozygosity in the population at large; the closer the parents, the larger
the coeﬃcient of inbreeding. A common concern is that consanguinity leads to higher levels of
mortality, morbidity and congenital malformations in oﬀspring due to the greater probability of
inheriting a recessive gene (Schull, 1959, and Bittles, 1994). According to Bittles (2001), the highest
level of inbreeding has been recorded in the South Indian city of Pondicherry, in which 54.9 percent
of marriages were consanguineous, corresponding to a mean coeﬃcient of inbreeding of 0.0449,
considered very high by the standards of other populations. The existing research on consanguinity
also shows that diﬀerent kinds of consanguineous unions are favoured by diﬀerent sub-populations:
for example, while Hindu women in South India typically marry their maternal uncles, Muslim
populations favour ﬁrst-cousin marriages (Iyer, 2002).3 Amongst immigrant populations in the UK,
those of Pakistani origin display a preponderance of consanguineous marriage, estimated to be as
high as 50 to 60 percent of all marriages in this community (Modell, 1991).
Historically in Europe, consanguineous marriage was prevalent until the 20th century, and was
associated with royalty and land-owning families (Bittles, 1994). During the 19th and 20th centuries,
consanguinity was practised more in the Roman Catholic countries of southern Europe than their
northern European Protestant counterparts (McCollough and O’Rourke, 1986). Since the 16th
century in England, marriage between ﬁrst cousins has been considered legal. The Marriage Act of
1949 laid down the kinds of marriage by aﬃnity which are considered void, and this was modiﬁed
by the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act of 1986. But close-kin marriages are not
always legally permitted elsewhere. For example, in the United States, diﬀerent states have rulings
on unions between ﬁrst cousins: in some states such unions are regarded as illegal; others go so
2The coeﬃcient of inbreeding is the probability that two homologous alleles in an individual are identical by descent
from a recent common ancestor.
3In South India, until the 1950s bridewealth rather than dowry was the preferred marriage system, and in West
Bengal as well this was the preferred wealth transfer at the time of marriage. We are grateful to Alan Bittles for
highlighting this point to us.
4far as to consider ﬁrst-cousin marriage a criminal oﬀence (Ottenheimer, 1996). Today in North
America and Western Europe, only 0.6 percent of marriages occur between ﬁrst cousins (Coleman,
1980; Bundey et al 1990). However this refers to white populations only. The overall prevalence
of consanguineous marriage, especially in Western European countries like France, Germany, The
Netherlands and the UK is now likely to be of the order of 1-3 percent or more.4 Although in overall
terms the inﬂuence of consanguineous marriage in the world is declining over time, it is particularly
popular in Islamic societies and among the poor and less educated populations in the Middle East
and South Asia (Hussain 1999, and Bittles, 2001).5
The popularity of consanguineous marriage in some societies may be attributed to religious
sanction that is provided to it. In Europe, Protestant denominations permit ﬁrst-cousin marriage.
On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church requires permission from a diocese to allow them.
The general consanguinity prescriptions in Islam are similar to those of Judaism. Judaism permits
consanguineous marriage in certain situations, such as for example, uncle-niece unions, but the
general prescriptions are similar to those of Islam. For understanding consanguinity in Bangladesh,
Islam and Hinduism are important. According to the institutional requirements of Islam in the
Koran and the Sunnah10, “a Muslim man is prohibited from marrying his mother or grandmother,
his daughter or granddaughter, his sister whether full, consanguine or uterine, his niece or great
niece, and his aunt or great aunt, paternal or maternal”. However, the Sunnah depict that the
Prophet Mohammad married his daughter Fatima to Ali, his paternal ﬁrst cousin; this has led
researchers to argue that for Muslims in practice, ﬁrst-cousin marriage follows the Sunnah (Bittles,
2001, and Hussain, 1999).6
Consanguineous marriage among Hindus, for example in India, has continued to occur despite
the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 which prohibited uncle-niece marriages, subsequently altered by the
Hindu Code Bill of 1984 (Appaji Rao et al., 2002). One reason for this is because consanguineous
marriage is tolerated by the Hindu scriptures.7 In South Asia more generally, consanguineous unions
w e r ev e r yc o m m o ni nt h ep a s ta n da r ec o m m o ne v e nt o d a y( C a l d w e l le ta l . ,1 9 8 3 ,a n dB i t t l e se t
al., 1993). Consanguinity in South Asia has been documented in sample surveys of the population
(Reddy, 1993). There are also a number of anthropological and biological surveys of consanguinity
among selected communities in southern India (Dronamaraju and Khan, 1963, Centerwall and Cen-
terwall, 1966, and Reddy, 1993). More recent evidence of the incidence of consanguineous marriage
comes from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) 1992-93, which collected data from 25 In-
dian states and interviewed 89,777 ever-married women aged 13-49. The data show that 16 percent
of marriages in India are consanguineous marriages, but that this varies from 6 percent in the north
to 36 percent in the south (Banerjee and Roy, 2002). The evidence from NFHS also shows that
consanguinity is still widespread in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (IIPS and ORC
4We are grateful to Alan Bittles for these estimates.
5Dowry is widely practiced in Turkey, although some studies do highlight that such payments were higher in
consanguineous marriages. In reality, this is thought to be purely symbolic as the money or property paid stayed
within the natal family.
6The Sunnah are the deeds of the Prophet Mohammad and their application to various situations.
7We are grateful to Srilata Iyer for alerting us to the following examples of consanguineous marriage in Hindu
mythology: In the Hindu epic poem the Mahabharata, the Hindu god Krishna’s niece Sasirekha (the daughter of
Krishna’s brother Balarama) is given in marriage to Abhimanyu, the son of Krishna’s sister Subhadra. Krishna
and Subhadra themselves were oﬀspring of Vasudeva; Subhadra was married to the warrior hero of the Mahabharata,
Arjuna, whose mother Kunthi was Vasudeva’a sister. Thus, in this example from Hindu mythology, in two generations
of the same family - Arjuna and Subhadra, Abhimanyu and Sasirekha - all married their ﬁrst cousins. In the epic
poem the Ramayana, the Hindu god Rama was married to Sita. Subsequently, Sita’s father’s brother’s daughters
Urmila, Sutakirti and Mandavi were given in marriage to Rama’s three brothers, Lakshmana, Shatrugna and Bharata,
evidence of more consanguineous marriages contracted in Hindu folklore.
5Macro International, 1995, Bittles, et al., 1993). The rates of consanguineous marriage are as high
as 52 percent in Tamil Nadu and 37 percent in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.8 T h ep r a c t i c ea l s o
seems to vary by religion. In India, 23.3 percent of all Muslim marriages are consanguineous, com-
pared to 10.6 percent of all Hindu marriages, 10.3 percent of all Christian marriages, and 17.1 percent
of all Buddhist marriages (Bittles, 2003).9
3 The Economics of Consanguinity
In this section, we propose a model of a marriage market in which couples form, sign a marriage
contract, and undertake investments after marriage. Two key assumptions lie at the starting point
of our model. The ﬁr s ti st h a td o w r i e se x i s ta n di n ﬂuence marriage outcomes. The second key
assumption concerns the role of social distance between the families of the bride and the groom. On
the one hand, we assume that ceteris paribus, social distance enhances the outcomes of marriage:
families can diversify genes, hedge risks, smooth consumption or simply integrate their social net-
works (Rosensweig and Stark, 1989; La Ferrara, 2003). On the other hand, shorter social distance
makes ex-ante contracting between families easier. Close relatives have more (veriﬁable) informa-
tion about each other or can draw on more eﬀective enforcement mechanisms. We now proceed to
a formal description of the forces at play.
3.1 The Model
Consider a continuum of potential spouses. Grooms and brides are assimilated to their families and
are labeled i ∈ I,a n dj ∈ J respectively. Spouse k ∈ {i,j} comes from a family endowed with wealth
wk.Ap a i r(i,j) is characterized by social distance dij ∈ [0,1]. We assume that brides and grooms’s
families are in equal number and have identical wealth distribution. The support of the wealth
distribution is the interval [wmin,w max]. For each individual with wealth w, there exists a potential
match who is at distance d, for all d ∈ [0,1]. Individuals and their families can be thought of as
being homogeneously distributed over a cylinder, such that the vertical axis represents individuals’
wealth w, and the angle between two individuals measures their distance (normalized by 2π), as
depicted on Figure 1.
The timing of the economy is as follows:
- T =0:Families choose a partner for their oﬀspring by ﬁrst designating a desired match. Couples
(i,j) form when two families have elected each other. A marriage contract is then signed between
the respective families. A marriage contract consists of immediate transfers (Di,D j) from i to j and
j to i respectively to be completed at signature of the contract, and a transfer commitment (zi,z j)
to be made in the following period.
- T =1:Families invest (Ki,K j) in the “marital production function”, output is realized and
consumption takes place.
8The exception though is Kerala, where a predominantally Christian population do not practice consanguineous
marriage.
9There are, however, strong regional diﬀerences between religions, for example in southern India, consanguinity
is more common among Hindus whereas in the western and northern areas, consanguinity is more common among
Muslims (Banerjee and Roy 2002, Bittles 2003).
6We make the assumptions that (i) marriage is always preferred to remaining single, and (ii) at
T =1 , separation is too costly to be considered. This last assumption is crucial to this paper. Before
completing the description of the marriage economy, here is the intuition for what will be modeled
subsequently. At T =1 , separation is too costly, so that once the marriage is celebrated, families
hold each other up, and have an incentive to free ride on one’s in-laws to contribute to the marital
production function. Thus, when enforcement is imperfect, a transfer commitment zk may not be
credible. We therefore perceive T =0t r a n s f e r sa sam e a n st om i t i g a t et h ee ﬀects of the hold-up
problem. The incentives to both parties to be able to commit to high levels of transfers are driven by
market forces: parents want a good match for their child, and are therefore willing to pay a higher
price for a better spouse.
Marital Production Function
We make the simplifying assumption that a marriage is a joint project characterized by a
constant-returns-to-scale technology in which both families invest:
R(K|wi,w j,d ij)=A(wi,w j,d ij)K,
where K is the aggregate amount invested. We assume that the productivity parameter A(wi,w j,d ij)
is continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing in wi and wj and increasing and concave with respect
to dij. In addition to monetary transfers, parents transmit social status to their children, share their
social networks and political connections, which we assume to have a direct eﬀect on their oﬀspring’s
productivity. Second, the positive dependence of A(.) on d is central to our paper, and captures the
idea that when spouses are further away, they can diversify genes, hedge risks, integrate their social
networks, and so forth. Finally, agents have access to a storage technology with returns normalized
to 1.
Marriage Contracts and the Cost of Equity
A marriage contract speciﬁes an investment commitment (zi,z j) and prior transfers (Di,D j)
between the parents of the bride and groom. When an investment commitment is made, it is binding.
However, due to contract incompleteness, parents cannot commit beyond the amount (1 − dij)wk
where we recall that dij is the social distance between i and j. Such an assumption captures the
idea that depending upon social distance, wealth in family j c a nb em o r ed i ﬃcult to observe for
family i, and hence more diﬃcult to pledge.
Thus, for each couple (i,j),afeasible marriage contract (zi,z j,D i,D j) must satisfy for k ∈ {i,j},

zk ∈ [0,(1 − dij)wk]
zk + Dk ∈ [0,w k] (1)
We also assume that the payment of dowries is costly. If a positive amount D is transferred by
family k, γ (wk)D is lost in the transaction. γ (.) is a decreasing function of wealth. We can think
of γ (w) as the interest rate charged when borrowing money to make a transfer. Richer families can
pledge collateral more easily, hence they enjoy lower interest rates (see e.g. Banerjee and Newman,
1993). We can think of (Di,D j) as mutual gift exchanges, so consider the net transfer from j to i :
Dij = Dj [1 − γ (wj)] − Di [1 − γ (wi)]
7that corresponds to a dowry when positive. At the beginning of time T =1 , families thus have total
wealth equal to wk + D−k [1 − γ (w−k)] − Dk that they can choose to either save, or invest in the
marital production function.
Preferences
Families do not capture the same share of the project’s output. We assume that the output
is divided between brides’ and grooms’ families according to exogenous shares (1 − α,α),t h a ta r e
identical for all brides and grooms respectively. To simplify the notation, we subsequently write
αi ≡ 1 − α,a n dαj ≡ α.10 For a given match (i,j), transfers (Di,D j)are made, and parents choose
T =1investment levels (Ki,K j) so that the payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y
Uk (Ki,K j,D i,D j)=αkA(wi,w j,d ij)(Ki + Kj) − Kk + {wk + D−k [1 − γ (w−k)] − Dk},
where k ∈ {i,j} and −k denotes k s spouse. Families’ utilities are linear in wealth. Each family k
captures a share αk of the marital output, while enjoying their endowment wk net of investment Kk
and transfers (received and made).
Besides, we assume that
A(wmin,w min,0)[1 − γ (wmin)] > 1, (2)
so that it is always socially optimal to invest in the marital production function.
3.2 Optimal and Constrained-Optimal Marriage Outcomes
In our economy, there is a potential divergence of preferences between the two families, and contract
incompleteness prevents the Coase theorem from holding. We therefore describe the ﬁrst-best out-
come of the economy. Then, we let agents invest according to their preferences at time T =1and
discuss the optimal matching proﬁle with associated marriage contracts.
Optimal marriage outcome
The ﬁrst-best outcome maximizes aggregate payoﬀs of all the families. On the intensive margin,
as T =0transfers are costly, D∗
i = D∗
j =0and (2) implies that K∗
k = wk for every k ∈ I ∪ J,s o
that K∗
ij = wi + wj.A n ym a t c h(i,j) is therefore characterized by aggregate payoﬀs
U∗
i (wi,w j,d ij)+U∗
j (wi,w j,d ij)=A(wi,w j,d ij)(wi + wj).
Individuals invest their entire endowment in the marital production function. Turning to the ex-
tensive margin, as A(.) is increasing in both wi and wj, grooms’ and brides’ wealth levels are
complementary, so that assortative mating is the ﬁrst-best outcome.11 Every “ﬁrst-best” couple
(i,j) is characterized by wi = wj and d∗
ij =1 .
10α is assumed independent of social distance. Relaxing this assumption will introduce additional dynamics that
we for now abstract from.
11The result is true as long as wi and wj are not “too” substituable, i.e. ∂2A/∂wi∂wj not “too” negative. See
Becker (1973).
8Constrained-optimal marriage outcome
We now restrict to outcomes for which investments are T =1incentive compatible. To character-
ize the constrained-ﬁrst-best outcome, we solve the game backward. We look at parental behavior at
T =1 , once couples have formed and signed a feasible marriage contract of the form (zi,z j,D i,D j).
Parents invest an amount K so as to maximize their reduced form payoﬀ
Vk (K)=αkA(wi,w j,d ij)(K + K−k) − K
subject to
zk ≤ K ≤ wk − Dk + D−k [1 − γ (w−k)]
The second constraint is the budget requirement: agents can invest their endowment net of transfers
made or received. The ﬁrst constraint indicates that parental transfers need to be at least as large
as the committed amount z, determined at signature of the marriage contract. For k = i,j, full
investment will take place if and only if
αkA(wi,w j,d ij) ≥ 1 (3)
otherwise families will invest the minimum committed amount K∗∗
k = zk. Thus, depending on the
values of α, we potentially have the following cases summarized in Figure 2:






=( wi − Di + Dj [1 − γ (wj)],z j), (4)
full investment takes place for the groom, and minimum investment is undertaken by the
bride’s family. The groom hence invests his endowment net of transfers received and made,
while the bride is not willing to go beyond the pre-committed amount.






=( zi,w j − Dj + Di [1 − γ (wi)]), (5)
• For intermediate values (zone IV), neither of the two families has any incentive to invest in






=( zi,z j). (6)
Although we could analyze the three cases separately, we will assume that α is low enough, so
t h a tt h ec a s ed e s c r i b e db y(4) prevails.12 Similar ruptures of symmetry between husbands and wives
have been made in the earlier literature. Botticini and Siow (2003) postulate that virilocality implies
a divergence of daughters’ preferences after marriage, while it is less so in the case of sons. Zhang
and Chan (1999) also break the symmetry between husbands and wives when studying how dowries
increase the bargaining power of daughters with respect to their husbands’ families. Alternatively,
we could allow for high values of α to describe societies in which bridewealth rather than dowry is
the main practice of wealth transfer.
12Namely, (1 − α)A(wmin,w min,0) ≥ 1 and αA(wmax,w max,1) ≤ 1. The fourth case (zone I) corresponds to the
situation in which A is large enough for incentive compatibility constraints not to bind. We ignore this possibility.
9The optimal marriage contract thus consists of maximizing total investment by spouses. This
implies that D∗∗
i =0 , D∗∗
j = dijwj and z∗∗
j =( 1− dij)wj. Under such an arrangement, a net dowry
Dij = dijwj [1 − γ (wj)] is transferred from the bride’s family to the groom’s family so that parental
aggregate payoﬀs are given by
U∗∗
i (wi,w j,d ij)+U∗∗
j (wi,w j,d ij)=A(wi,w j,d ij)[wi + wj − γ (wj)dijwj].
Constrained-optimal investment levels are characterized by full-investment in the marital production
function, but as opposed to the ﬁrst-best solution, transfer costs are lost when the dowry is paid to
the groom’s family. As γ (.) is a decreasing function of wealth, assortative mating is still optimal.
The institution of dowry is then seen as an instrument to overcome the limited commitment ability
of families. However, as social distance now determines dowry amounts, the constrained-ﬁrst-best
is now characterized by an optimal distance d(w) such that for each couple (i,j) with wealth levels
wi = wj = w, we have,
d(w) ∈ arg max
d∈[0,1]
A(w,w,d)[2w − γ (w)dw].
The ﬁr s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i o nf o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ng i v e s
∂A(w,w,d)
∂d
[2 − γ (w)d(w)] = γ (w)A(w,w,d), (7)
which is necessary and suﬃcient as the reduced-form payoﬀ function is concave in d.
3.3 Time-Inconsistency and the Rationale for Dowries
We will show that there exists one equilibrium of the marriage market which is as if each spouse
k faced a matching function Wk (x) where Wk (x) i st h em a r r i a g ee n d o w m e n tl e v e lo fk s spouse,
when k credibly contributes a total of x into the relationship. Contribution x is divided between a
commitment z, and a ex-ante transfer D. We will show that such an equilibrium exists, but for now,
we assume for simplicity that it does. For both the groom and the bride, the time-inconsistency
problem is inherently the same, but it is just not binding for grooms as long as Wi (.) is non-
decreasing, which we assume for now, but will prove later on (see proposition 1 below). We thus pay
attention exclusively to the optimization problem on the bride’s side. To better convey our intuition,
we further suppose that Wj (.) is diﬀerentiable with respect to x and α





the neighborhood of xj = wj.13
At T =0 , brides’ families take Wj (.), and grooms’ investment strategies deﬁned by (4) as given,
and propose a feasible marriage contract (zj,D j) to groom i such that
{zj,D j} ∈ arg max
0≤z≤(1−dij)wj
0≤z+D≤wj
αA(Wj (z + D),w j,d ij)[Wj (z + D)+z + D − γ (wj)D] − z − D (8)
At the equilibrium point, i.e. when Wj (wj)=wj and social distance d(wj) is optimally chosen, the
ﬁrst-order conditions for interior solutions can be written as








13Wk (.) are generally not diﬀerentiable, but the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix shows that the argument
discussed here is still valid.
10The optimal contribution level trades oﬀ the opportunity cost of storage (normalized to 1) against
the beneﬁts from being matched with a wealthier groom.14 The left-hand side of (9) captures such
beneﬁt. The ﬁrst term, αA(wj,w j,d(wj))[1 − γ (wj)], is the “marginal marital product”, simi-
lar to (3) at the diﬀerence that there is an extra [1− γ (wj)] term because the marginal dollar
transferred takes the form of a dowry. The second term, absent from (3), captures the rationale
underlying the existence of dowries: an increase in the overall contribution of the bride, allows
her to increase the wealth of her match by W 
j (wj). The beneﬁt is then direct through an in-
creased investment αW 
j (wj)A(wj,w j,d(wj)) —a“ q u a n t i t y ”e ﬀect, and indirect through an in-
creased productivity coeﬃcient αW 
j (wj)
∂A(wj,wj,d(wj))
∂wi — a “quality” eﬀect. Under the assump-
tion that α

1 − γ (wj)+W 
j (wj)

≥ 1, the solution hits a corner, and brides want to pre-commit
zj + Dj = wj, so that the investment is constrained-optimal.
Comparing with the T =1problem, we see that the bride’s family would like to commit at
T =0an amount that they will however not be willing to disburse at T =1 . To overcome this
time-inconsistency problem, the bride’s family at the time of marriage, transfers control rights of
part or all of their assets to the groom’s family, as they cannot commit to make such a transfer after
the marriage is celebrated. We therefore view dowries as an ex-ante transfer of control rights when
ex-post investment incentives are distorted.
Proposition: There exists an equilibrium of the marriage market which is constrained-optimal,
and such that oﬀ-equilibrium strategies support a reduced-form game in which families maximizes
payoﬀs, taking the matching functions Wi (.) and Wj (.) described above as given.
Though the matching function Wj (.) is not generally diﬀerentiable in wj, the Proposition shows
that in the general case, any small reduction h in the aggregate contribution of bride j decreases
the wealth of her match by at least βh,w h e r eβ is a positive constant. The tradeoﬀ captured by (9)
hence applies similarly when β is large enough.
The emergence of the institution of dowries responds to the need to overcome a time-inconsistency
problem. Parents contribute up-front what they cannot credibly commit at a later stage. Botticini
and Siow (2003) address a similar issue, but the time-inconsistency problem lies at a diﬀerent level:
daughters cannot commit to manage parental assets as eﬃciently when they live in their husbands’
home. Thus, it is more eﬃcient for altruistic parents to transfer dowries to daughters and leave
bequests to sons. Our approach on the other hand considers that marital transfers reﬂect the price
of spouses in the marriage market, but contracting problems require that price to be paid in two
stages: dowries are precisely the ﬁrst-stage of these transfers.
3.4 Credit Constraints, Wealth and Consanguinity
Another dimension that needs investigation is social distance. Proposition 1 established that there
exists an equilibrium such that the social distance d(w) between spouses of wealth w is given by





[2 − γ (w)d(w)]
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The left-hand side of (10) measures the marginal cost of consanguinity. By construction, we assumed
that marrying close kin would have a direct negative eﬀect on payoﬀs because families cannot
diversify genes thus increasing the risk of congenital diseases, having more limited ability to hedge
risks across families (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), or for example, by putting together their social
networks for better access to credit or labor markets (La Ferrara, 2003). The right-hand side of
(10) may be termed the agency cost. Wealth is imperfectly observed and thus it translates into an
agency problem. Increasing the distance between spouses increases the agency problem, requiring a
larger dowry to be paid. This implies a larger dowry transfer cost, which is not invested and which
translates into an opportunity cost of investment.
In summary, we have so far described a marriage market failure for which consanguinity and
dowries are two distinct mitigating devices, which act as substitutes. Dowries are an ex-ante transfer
of control over assets to palliate a lack of ex-post incentives to invest. Consanguinity is a practice
which directly reduces the agency problem. In so doing, we have also addressed the optimal tradeoﬀ
between the two. One immediate implication relates to the prevalence of consanguinity when credit
constraints are more stringent. Applying the implicit function theorem to (10) shows that for every















The intuition underlying (11) is straightforward. When credit constraints are more stringent ceteris
paribus, dowries are more costly relatively to close-kin marriage, so that equilibrium social distance
decreases with the cost of equity.
A second implication of the analysis conducted so far is a comparative statics exercise with
respect to wealth. Related to result (11), our model predicts that at low levels of wealth, the dowry
transfer cost is large because credit constraints are more stringent, making consanguineous marriage
an attractive alternative to dowry payments. However, if we re-examine the right-hand side of (10),
the tension between costs and beneﬁts is also driven by the opportunity cost of investment. To see
this more formally, and given that the second-order condition holds, we can determine the slope of
the correspondence between distance and wealth levels by applying the implicit function theorem to
(10):











where the elasticities are deﬁned by εγ (w) ≡− w
γ3(w)
γ(w) , εw







A (w,d) ≡ d
∂
∂dA(w,w,d)
A(w,w,d) . εγ (.) captures the aforementioned cost-of-equity eﬀect, while εA (w,d)
measures the opportunity-cost eﬀect at the equilibrium point.15
15To avoid any interference due to the interaction between d and w through A(w,w,d),w ea s s u m et h a tA(.) is
separable in d and w.
12T h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h e s et w oe ﬀects will shape the behavior of social distance along
the wealth dimension. There are two cases of interest. First, when the elasticity εw
A (w,d) of the
productivity parameter is low enough and is dominated by εγ (w), then equation (12) predicts
that social distance increases with wealth.16 The intuition has been discussed at several occasions.
When, as assumed, (10) is mostly driven by the dowry transfer cost, poorer people will face more
stringent credit constraints, translating into larger cost of equity. Thus, poorer families will opt for
consanguineous marriages as a viable alternative to dowries. Second, an augmented scenario consists
of assuming that the opportunity-cost-of-investment eﬀect binds at higher levels of wealth.17 Then,
at low levels of wealth, (12) is mostly driven by εγ or cost of equity: poor families face very steep
losses when raising cash to pay for the dowry, and thus the gains to marrying close relative are
large. On the other hand, when wealth levels increase, εw
A eventually dominates: even though the
loss from dowry transfers is lower, it translates into large opportunity costs of investment that call
for narrower social distance between spouses. Thus, consanguinity might be more prevalent at the
two extremes of the wealth distribution suggesting that the relationship between social distance and
wealth may be inverted-U shaped (for a more detailed analysis, see an earlier version of this paper,
Do, Iyer and Joshi, 2006). This last result provides a theoretical foundation for the oft-cited ﬁnding
of consanguinity among the wealthy: in societies in which women inherit land, close-kin marriage are
used to keep land and other productive assets within the extended family (Goody, 1986, Agarwal,
1994, Bittles, 2001, The New York Times, 23 September 2003). Put in the context of our model,
this common view is explained by the observation that large landowners may favor consanguineous
marriages arguably because the payment of the dowry would require them to sell the land in order
to transfer assets, which would then come at a prohibitive opportunity cost of investment.
4 Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh
In this section, we use data from Bangladesh to test the key predictions of the theoretical model.
We ﬁnd very strong support for the theory, as illustrated by our ﬁndings below. The data are drawn
from the 1996 Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey, or MHSS.18 We also supplement these
data with that on climate data on annual rainfall levels in the Matlab area for the period 1950-
1996.19 The MHSS contains information on 4,364 households in 141 villages. Matlab is an Upazila
(subdistrict) of Chandpur district, which is about 50 miles South of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh.
85 percent or more of the people in Matlab are Muslims and the remainder are Hindus.20 Though
it is geographically close to Dhaka, the area is relatively isolated and inaccessible to communication
and transportation other than by river transport. The society is predominantly an agricultural
16As u ﬃcient condition is for example εγ (w) ≥ εw
A (w,d) for every w and d.
17Suﬃcient conditions could for example be that εd
A (.) is bounded, so that there exists (m,M) such that for any w
and d, εd
A (.) ∈ [m,M], and (i) limw→0
εw
A(w,d)
εγ(w) <m ,uniformly with respect to d : the interest rate curve is relatively
steeper at low levels of wealth, and (ii) limw→+∞
εw
A(w,d)
εγ(w) >M ,uniformly with respect to d : the productivity curve
is relatively steeper at high levels of wealth. Functions γ (w)=γ0/wγ,w i t hγ > 0,a n dA(wi,w j,d)=ewi +ewj +dθ,
θ < 1, would satisfy such requirements.
18This survey is a collaborative eﬀort of RAND, the Harvard School of Public Health, the University of Pennsylvania,
the University of Colorado at Boulder, Brown University, Mitra and Associates and the International Centre for
Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDRB).
19This data, the “University of Delaware Air and Temperature Precipitation Data” are provided by the NOAA-
CIRES Climate Diagnostics Center, Boulder, Colorado, USA, from their Web site at http://www.cdc.noaa.gov/.
20Most Hindus in Bangladesh belong to lower castes. As a result, the structure of the caste system in Bangladesh
is much less rigid than in India, and the principles of Islam play a greater role in governing social relations.
13society, although 30 percent of the population reports being landless. Despite a growing emphasis
on education and increasing contact with urban areas, the society remains relatively traditional and
religiously conservative (Fauveau, 1994).
4.1 Preliminary Descriptive Statistics
For the purpose of understanding the incidence of consanguinous marriage in the MHSS data, we
rely on the section of the survey that asked men and women retrospective information about their
marriage histories. In the sample of ever-married men, information was available on 4,627 marriages
and in the sample of ever-married women, information was available on 6,001 marriages. These
marriages included not only current marriages, but also past marriages if applicable. We stress
therefore the reliability of the marriage data in the survey which permits us to understand changes
in this society over time.21 There were 20 percent of ever-married women who reported marrying a
relative (either a ﬁr s t - c o u s i no ra n yo t h e rr e l a t i v e ,p r e s u m a b l yas e c o n d - c o u s i n ) . 22 These included
22 percent of Muslim women, and 3 percent of Hindu women. These numbers are comparable to
the estimates from the Indian NFHS which were previously discussed, and which provide a valuable
comparison with Bangladesh’s neighbor, India. For the sample as a whole, the most popular forms
of consanguineous marriage were to ﬁrst cousins on both the mother’s and father’s sides. There were
6 6 2w o m e n( 1 1p e r c e n to fa l lm a r r i a g e s )w h oh a dm a r r i e daﬁrst-cousin.
Our ﬁr s ts t e pi ne x p l o r i n gt h ed e t e r m i n a n t so fﬁrst-cousin marriage in this population involves
ac o m p a r i s o no fc i r c u m s t a n c e sa tm a r r i a g et h r o u g hs imple descriptive statistics of retrospective
information on socioeconomic status at the time of marriage. We examine four diﬀerent types
of marriages: marriages between unrelated individuals, marriages between ﬁrst-cousins, marriages
between relatives other than ﬁrst-cousins and marriages between non-relatives in the same village.
The diﬀerences between these diﬀerent types of marriages can shed light on how “substitutable”
diﬀerent forms of social capital are, and thus help us isolate the extent to which kinship alone aﬀects
t h en a t u r eo fam a r r i a g ec o n t r a c t .
We ﬁrst consider the sample of 5607 married women between the ages of 15 and 60 at the time
of the survey. Table 1 Panel (A) presents information on the various determinants of the types of
marriages under consideration. First, although there is no diﬀerence in the age at menarche for the
four types of women, those women who marry their ﬁr s t - c o u s i n st e n dt od os ow h e nt h e ya r eo n
average a year younger than women who marry non-relatives in diﬀerent villages, while women who
marry relatives do so when they are on average a year older. Second, women who marry their ﬁrst-
cousins and/or relatives other than ﬁrst-cousins are about 10 percentage points less likely to bring a
dowry at the time of marriage. This suggests that the reduced dowry aﬀorded by a consanguineous
marriage may have been an important consideration in the decision to marry a relative (as tested
further below). Third, women who marry ﬁrst-cousins, relatives other than ﬁrst-cousins, and women
who marry non-relatives within the village, have about a third and half a year less schooling than
their counterparts who marry non-relatives outside of the village. Fourth, though their fathers are
slightly more likely to have attended school, they are less likely to own farmland.
21There were 15 percent of men and only about 7 percent of women who reported that they have had more than
one marriage. This diﬀerence is driven by the fact that while divorced and widowed men typically remarry, most
women in these same circumstances do not (Joshi, 2004).
2211 percent of all marriages were marriages to ﬁrst-cousins.
14N e x t ,w ep e r f o r mt h es a m ei n v e s t i g a t i o na c r o s st h es a m p l eo fm a r r i e dm e n .T h es a m p l ei n c l u d e s
3084 married men above the age of 15. Only information on ﬁrst marriages is analyzed. The results
are presented in panel (B) of Table 1. Some of the same observations that we made for the women’s
sample can be made here as well. The signiﬁcance of the lower dowry in consanguineous marriages is
striking here again. However, two additional observations are also noteworthy: ﬁrst, while men who
enter cousin-marriages are about a year younger than their counterparts who marry non-relatives in
other villages, men who marry relatives other than ﬁrst-cousins however, enter these marriages two
years later. Second, men who enter ﬁrst-cousin marriages have about 1 year less of schooling, and
men who enter into marriages with other relatives have about 0.5 years less of schooling.
An additional insight from Panels (A) and (B) of Table 1 relates to inheritances. Note that
women who marry their cousin are 5 percentage points more likely to inherit property, or expect
to inherit property, than their counterparts who do not marry their cousins. For adult men who
marry their cousins however, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the tendency to inherit
or expect to inherit property. Marrying within the village does not have this eﬀect for either men
or women. Later in this section, we will return to a discussion of the role of wealth in contracting
cousin-marriages.
Our next step in exploring the determinants of ﬁrst-cousin marriage in this population involves
estimating reduced form regressions wherein a dummy variable describing a consanguineous match is
regressed on various measures of a family’s socioeconomic status at the time of marriage. The sample
includes 3084 married men above the age of 15 and below the age of 60. Focussing on the men has
the important advantage that information on socioeconomic status (as measured by holdings of land,
or housing quality) may be used as proxies for these variables at the time of marriage too. We lack
this information for women because they are no longer living in their natal homes. The independent
variables are summarized in Table 2. Several results presented in Table 3 are noteworthy. Muslims
are more likely to enter into consanguineous marriages, but not more likely to marry non-relatives in
the same village. Attending a religious school however, has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability of marrying a cousin (column (1)), a relative (column (2)), a non-relative in the same
village (column (3)) and cousin in the same village (column (4)): a boy with religious education is
approximately 5 percent less likely to marry a ﬁrst cousin and between 4—5 percent less likely to
enter into the other three types of marriages considered here.
4.2 Dowry and Consanguinity
A ﬁrst test of the theoretical model involves examining the simple correlations between the payment
of dowries and ﬁrst-cousin marriages, relative marriages and marriages between non-relatives. The
results in Table 1 indicate that compared to women who marry non-relatives, women who marry
their ﬁrst-cousins are 10 percentage points less likely to bring a dowry; women who marry any
relatives are 7 percentage points less likely to bring a dowry; and women who marry non-relatives
from the same village are 4 percentage points less likely to bring a dowry at the time of marriage.
These results are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. We interpret these results as evidence that (i)
dowry and consanguinity are closely correlated; and (ii) social capital through geographic proximity
is an imperfect substitute for kinship.
In a more formal test of the theory, we regress the variable Dowry on the various measures of
consanguinity that were considered previously and control for age, education, and socioeconomic
15status at the time of marriage. The results are presented in panels (A) to (C) of Table 4A. Note
that even when control variables are added to the regression, women who marry their ﬁrst-cousins
or other relatives are 6—7 percentage points less likely to bring a dowry and the eﬀect is generally
statistically signiﬁcant. Considering that in this population, about 35 percent of all women report
the payment of a dowry at the time of marriage, this is a substantial and important diﬀerence. It
is interesting that marriage to non-kin within a village (Table 4A, panel (C)) is not related to the
payment of dowry in any statistically signiﬁcant way. Again, we interpret this as evidence that
marriage to a non-relative within the same village and marriage to a cousin are rather diﬀerent. The
reduction in dowry has more to do with the particular form of social capital that is associated with
kinship rather than just familiarity and trust that come from residing in close proximity. In Table
4B, we use the logarithm of the dowry values as an alternate dependent variable and obtain similar
results as in Table 4A. After controlling for time ﬁxed-eﬀects, and other individual characteristics,
the results show 20 percent lower dowry values among consanguineous unions.
The relationship between dowry and consanguinity over time can be observed in Figure 3. Note
that dowries in Matlab have been increasing, but the practice of consanguinity has been falling. The
rise in dowries can be explained by our model: in a setting where improvements in transportation
and communication allow individuals to search over greater distances for matches with higher so-
cial distances (than consanguineous marriages or same-village marriages), the problem of ex-ante
commitment becomes greater and is solved by the payment of higher levels of dowry. This is also a
possible explanation for the rise in the prevalence of dowry in India (Tambiah, 1973; Rao, 1993).23
We hope to explore this issue in future work. In any event, the vital importance of a reduced dowry
in the context of a consanguineous marriage emerges from the formal tests of our theoretical model.
4.3 Consanguinity, Dowries and Wealth
To understand the role of wealth and credit constraints in contracting consanguinous marriages, we
begin by examining the bivariate relationships between consanguinous marriage, dowry and measures
of wealth at the time of marriage. Since the 1996 MHSS is a cross-sectional survey, information on
pre-marital wealth levels is rather limited. Our ﬁrst proxy is simply the value of father’s landholdings.
Since land markets in rural South Asia are known to be thin (UNDP, 2000), we rely on measures of
current landholdings (or landholdings at the time of father’s death) as a proxy for past landholdings.
If current landholdings are aﬀected by marital contracts, this measure will be an imperfect measure
of socio-economic status. To deal with this issue, we also consider a meaure of father’s education.
To the extent that a father’s education is determined before his children marry, this measure will be
a good proxy for permanent income and/or socio-economic status of a household. In some places
we simply consider a dummy variable that indicates whether a father completed primary school.
Bivariate kernel density estimates for consanguinous marriage (as deﬁned by being married to
a ﬁrst-cousin or another relative) and measures of wealth are presented in Figure 4. Note that the
relationship is non-monotonic: the practice of consanguinous marriage is higher at the two extremes
o ft h ew e a l t hd i s t r i b u t i o nt h a ni nt h em i d d l e ,a sp r edicted by our theoretical model. The robustness
of this relationship is econometrically explored in Table 5A. Note that the incidence of consanguinous
23The demographic transition may have been an additional factor that may have contributed to the decrease in
ﬁrst-cousin marriage and the rising popularity of dowry. The reduction in family size in conjunction with prescribed
spousal age diﬀerences, could have resulted in the non-availability of ﬁrst-cousin spouses. We are grateful to Alan
Bittles for alerting us to this possibility.
16marriage decreases with the increase in the value of father’s farmland (the results are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level), conﬁrming that consanguinous marriages are more common
among poorer households. The estimates also conﬁrm that the relationship between farmland and
consanguinity may be non-linear. We turn now to an examination of the relationship between dowry
and wealth. Figure 5 shows that the relationship between dowry and wealth is also non-monotonic
and that as the theory predicts, is the exact inverse of the relationship between consanguinity and
wealth: as wealth levels rise, dowries ﬁrst increase, reach a peak and then decrease. Table 5B explores
the relationship between dowry and wealth econometrically. Panel (A) regresses the log of dowry
values on father’s farmland value and its squared term, and Panel (B) regresses dowry values on a
dummy variable indicating father’s completion of primary school. The coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant even with the inclusion of individual, household, rainfall and decade of marriage controls.
Standardization of the coeﬃcients from the farmland regression indicate that a 1 percent increase
in the value of farmland causes the dowry paid to increase by approximately 35 percent. Similarly,
a father’s completion of primary school increases the value of the dowry by about 500 taka, which
is about 25 percent of the average value of a dowry in this sample. The estimates for the squared
term of farmland are also statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the non-linearities that are predicted
by the theoretical model.
Taken together, the results of Table 5A and Table 5B suggest that as families get wealthier
(starting from an initial condition of low levels of wealth), credit constraints may weaken and the
family is able to search for a groom outside the kinship network by providing higher levels of
dowries for their daughters. These results are also consistent with the results of Mobarak, Kuhn
and Peters (2006), who use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework to show that the construction of
an embankment in Matlab (several years prior to the 1996 data) created a positive wealth shock for
some households, who were then able to pay higher dowries for their daughters and were less likely
to enter into consanguinous marriages. Our results conﬁrm this ﬁnding but also raise the additional
possibility that the relationship is non-linear. At very high levels of wealth for example, households
may once again prefer to contract marriages within the kinship network and resist the transfer of
wealth to unrelated individuals through either dowries or future inheritances.
As an additional test of the hypothesis of credit constraints, we explore the relationship between
cousin marriage, dowry and age at marriage. As noted earlier in this section, marriages to ﬁrst-
cousins take place at younger ages than marriages to unrelated individuals. The results in Table
6B suggest that the relationship between dowry and age at marriage is positive. In particular, the
estimates from column (4) suggest that a one standard deviation delay in the age at marriage (i.e.
almost 3 years) increases the value of the dowry by 0.7 standard deviations, or approximately 2800
taka. The speciﬁcation where the value of the dowry is regressed on the age at marriage suﬀers
from a possible endogeneity problem. It is possible for example, that the age at marriage is in fact
an outcome rather than a determinant of a household’s ability to pay a dowry. We deal with this
issue by instrumenting the age at marriage with the age at menarche. Since most marriages in
rural Bangladesh are contracted at, or just after, the time of the onset of puberty, we assume that
this variable will be highly correlated with the age at marriage. We thus assume that the age at
menarche aﬀects parental credit constraints only through the the time of a woman’s marriage. This
exclusion restriction is motivated by the observation that in rural Bangladesh, as in much of South
Asia, the age at menarche is a lower bound on the age at which marriages are contracted, with the
lag between the onset of menarche and the contracting of a marriage increasing steadily over time
(Iyer 2002).24 We concede, however, that our exclusion restriction relies on the assumption that
24In our dataset, women aged 35 and younger married at an average age of 17. Only 103 marriages (out of 6294
17socio-economic status, hence nutritional status, does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the age at menarche.
While this issue is open for discussion, empirical evidence from the Matlab data seems to conﬁrm the
absence of such correlation. We also control for various measures of socio-economic status, without
this aﬀecting both ﬁrst and second stages. The results of the IV estimation are presented in Column
(5) and (6) of Table 7. Note that the second stage estimates of the coeﬃcient for the age at marriage
are very close to the estimates obtained from the OLS speciﬁcation and that the coeﬃcient is still
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. We interpret this as evidence in support of the existence of credit
constraints. In other words, we believe ﬁrmly that a family may well delay a girl’s marriage in order
to build up and to consolidate the equity that is required to pay her dowry at the time of marriage.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has argued that consanguinity is a response to a marriage market failure in developing
countries. The starting point of our analysis is the recognition that dowries exist across many
societies, and that consanguinity is also pervasive across many parts of the world. We propose a
theoretical model of a marriage market to reconcile the existence of these two facts. We argue that
these two social practices together address an agency problem between spouses’ families and then
provide empirical evidence that corroborates the central predictions of the model. By focusing on
the economic underpinnings of consanguineous marriage, we help explain the seeming puzzle of why
consanguineous marriage continues to take place in modern times in developing countries, despite
the greater knowledge (from the medical and biological sciences) that such marriages may lead to a
greater likelihood of congenital birth defects. By providing a rationale for consanguinity that does
not rely on an exogenous preference argument, we encourage a reappraisal of the welfare implications
of regulating marriage markets in such contexts.
women) appear to be ‘child’ marriages, i.e. cases of marriage where the age at marriage was less than 11.
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20Appendix
Before we outline our proofs, we ﬁrst formally deﬁne the game, the strategies and the equilibrium
concept. As we require equilibria to be subgame perfect, we only consider the T =0reduced-form
game, as sub-game strategies have been discussed at length previously.
Timing and Strategies: Each family i and j announce a choice j (i) and i(j) respectively, and a couple
(i,j) forms when i = i(j) and j = j (i). Each family k proposes a contract proﬁle {zk,D k}k∈I∪J,
where zk is the amount committed by k,a n dDk is the transfer made from k to −k.B yc o n v e n t i o n ,
when no oﬀer is made, we write {z,D} = ∅. We furthermore restrict ourselves to feasible contracts
deﬁned by (1) only. If an individual fails to ﬁnd a spouse, his or her payoﬀ is set to −∞.O n c e
marriage is celebrated, transfers (Di,D j) take place but spouse k only receives D−k [1 − γ (w−k)] as
a result of transaction costs. Payoﬀs for each couple (i,j) are then
Ui (zi,z j,D i,D j|dij,w i,w j)=αiA(wi,w j,d ij)[wi + zj + Dj (1 − γ (wj)) − Di], (13)
and
Uj (zi,z j,D i,D j|dij,w i,w j)=αjA(wi,w j,d ij)[wi + zj + Dj (1 − γ (wj)) − Di] (14)
+Di [1 − γ (wi)] + (wj − zj − Dj).
Equilibrium deﬁnition: A match proﬁle {(i,j)}i∈I,j∈J with associated marriage contract proﬁle
{(zk,D k)}k∈I∪J is an equilibrium if there is no pair of couples (i,j) and (ˆ ı,ˆ ) respectively char-
acterized by wealth endowments (wi,w j) and (wˆ ı,w ˆ ), social distance dij and. dˆ ıˆ ,w h os i g n e da
feasible contract {(zk,D k)}k=i,j and

zˆ k,D ˆ k

ˆ k=ˆ ı,ˆ , and (i) eitherˆ ı proposes to j a feasible contract
q






ˆ zˆ ı, ˆ zj, ˆ Dˆ ı, ˆ Dj|dˆ ıj,w ˆ ı,w j





ˆ zˆ ı, ˆ zj, ˆ Dˆ ı, ˆ Dj|dˆ ıj,w ˆ ı,w j

≥ Uj (zi,z j,D i,D j|dij,w i,w j)
with one inequality holding strictly, (ii) or the reverse: ˆ  proposes i a feasible contract that does not
make any them worse-oﬀ, while making one of the two strictly better-oﬀ.
We ﬁnally deﬁne for each w, d(w), the solution to maxd∈[0,1] A(w,w,d)[2w − γ (w)dw].C o n -
cavity with respect to d implies that d(w) is well-deﬁned and d(w) ∈ (0,1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n :Let’s consider the following strategies. Every groom i ∈ I, chooses j (i)
such that wi = wj(i) and dij(i) = d(wi) as deﬁned by (7). Similarly, j chooses i(j) such that wj =
wi(j) and di(j)j = d(wj).O na n do ﬀ equilibrium transfers are given by {zi,D i} = {(1 − dij)wi,0}
and {zj,D j} = {(1 − dij)wj,d ijwj} for grooms and brides respectively. Such strategy proﬁle leads
to a constrained-optimal marriage outcome as described in section 3.2. To see that this is an
equilibrium, let’s characterize brides and grooms response functions. First, if the distance between
the two families is not characterized by (7) there are strict Pareto gains to form diﬀerent pairs.
Moreover, contracts are not binding as far as grooms are concerned. However, if we suppose that
grooms can credibly commit to invest less in a relationship than their entire wealth, for every groom
i ∈ I,w ed e ﬁne Wi (x) the wealth of i sm a t c hi fi ends up investing x in the relationship.
Γi (x)={j ∈ J, A(wi,w j,d ij)[x + wj − [1 − γ (wj)]] ≥ A(wj,w j,d(wj))[2wj − [1 − γ (wj)]d(wj)wj]}
21is such that
Γi (x) ⊆ Γi (x ) if and only if x ≤ x 
so that Wi (x) is non-decreasing. Furthermore, we have Wi (wi)=wi. The maximization of (13)
subject to matching function Wi (.) implies that a groom’s family always announces the highest
possible commitment. Now take a bride j ∈ J, with wealth wj. The case we need to consider is
when a bride j with wealth wj prefers to marry of groom i with wealth wi <w j but in exchange
can obtain a lower level of marital commitment. Suppose that j decides to reduce her commitment
by an amount h>0, so that her contribution is now x = wj −h. This reduction will be a reduction
in the dowry, as it is relatively more expensive. For any potential i ∈ I, the net investment made in
the relationship is equal to
wi + wj − γ (wj)dijwj − h[1 − γ (wj)]. (15)
We want to determine β such that groom i with wealth wi = wj − βh will refuse an oﬀer from j.
The equilibrium payoﬀ of family i is given by
Ueq (wj,β,h)=Aeq (wj,β,h)Keq (wj,β,h)
where
Aeq (wj,β,h)=A(wj − βh,wj − βh,d(wj − βh))
and Keq =2 wj − 2βh − γ (wj − βh)d(wj − βh)(wj − βh),
while the payoﬀ of family i if she accepts the oﬀer from j is
Udev (wj,β,h)=Adev (wj,β,h)Kdev (wj,β,h)
where
Adev (wj,β,h)=A(wj − βh,wj,d(wj,β,h))
and Kdev (wj,β,h)=2 wj − βh − h − γ (wj)(d(wj,β,h)wj − h),
in which d(wj,β,h) is the optimal distance between i and j. A Taylor expansion around wj gives
Keq (wj,β,h)=Kdev (wj,β,h)
+h[1 − β − γ (wj)(1− βd(wj − βh)) + βγ  (wj)d(wj − βh)wj]
+o(h)
where o(h) is a continuous function of h such that limh→0
1
ho(h)=0 . Note that the envelope theorem
implies that d(wj,β,h)=d(wj − βh)+o(h). Similarly, looking at the productivity coeﬃcient,








Combining these equalities, we obtain
Ueq (wj,β,h)=Udev (wj,β,h)+h








Θ(β)=1− β − γ (wj)[1− βd(wj − βh)] + βγ  (wj)d(wj − βh)wj.




A(wj,w j,d(wj))Θ(β) − β
∂A(wj,w j,d(wj))
∂wj




Ueq (wj,β,h) >U dev (wj,β,h)
if and only if
β < βj ≡




A(wj,wj,d(wj)) (2 − γ (wj)wj)+1− γ (wj)d(wj) − γ  (wj)d(wj)wj
.
Thus, for every j ∈ J, limh→0
Wj(wj)−Wj(wj−h)
h ≤ βj. From the expression above, we can see that
βj > 0 for all j ∈ J.T h et r a d e o ﬀ captured in (9) can now be written given that the bride’s family





α[A(Wj (wj − h),w j,d)(Wj (wj − h)+wj − h − γ (wj)[dwj − h])] + h
As u ﬃcient condition for the constrained-optimal outcome to be an equilibrium is that for any ε > 0,
there exists η > 0 such that for any h ≤ η,







The marginal beneﬁt of investing h outside the relationship needs to be higher than the rate
of savings normalized to 1; we therefore make the suﬃcient assumption that for every j ∈ J,
α

1 − γ (wj)+βj

> 1, which implies that the optimal solution for j is to choose h =0 .Q E D . 
23Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of Wealth and Social Distance
Figure 2: InvestmentPatterns
24Figure 3: The prevalence of dowry, cousin-marriage, relative marriage, marriages between cousins in the
same village and non-relatives in the same village. Responses are based on the sample of adult men.
25Figure 4: Test of the relationship between cousin marriage and wealth.
Figure 5: Test of the relationship between the payment of dowry and a woman’s father’s years of schooling.
26Figure 6: Test of the relationship between the payment of dowry and a woman’s father’s years of schooling.
27Table 1: Diﬀerences in circumstances at marriage for the following types of marriages:
(a) ﬁrst-cousins, (b) relatives other than ﬁrst-cousins, (c) non-relatives in the same village.
Variable Married Married Married Married Diﬀerences
between Cousin Relative Non-Relative,
Unrelated Individuals Same Village
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (1) (3) - (1) (4) - (1)
Panel A: Estimates from Sample of Adult Females
Age at menarche 14.283 14.221 14.175 14.198 -.062 -.108 -.085
(.070) (.078) (.062)
Age at marriage 14.723 13.855 15.737 14.512 -.868 1.014 -.211
(.197)∗∗∗ (.311)∗∗∗ (.177)
Dowry .367 .258 .294 .327 -.109 -.073 -.040
(.022)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.020)∗
Years of schooling 2.236 1.898 2.263 1.613 -.338 .027 -.623
(.141)∗∗ (.166) (.127)∗∗∗
Number of male siblings 2.373 2.252 2.394 2.521 -.121 .021 .149
(.073) (.085) (.066)∗
Number of female siblings 2.129 2.010 1.935 2.008 -.119 -.194 -.121
(.070) (.081)∗ (.063)∗
Mother ever attended school .012 .015 .024 .003 .003 .012 -.009
(.005) (.006) (.004)∗
Father ever attended school .012 .028 .034 .007 .015 .022 -.005
(.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.005)
Father owns farmland .914 .897 .884 .917 -.017 -.030 .003
(.013) (.016)∗ (.012)
Inherit or expect to inherit .205 .256 .226 .232 .051 .021 .028
property from parents (.019)∗∗∗ (.022) (.017)
Panel B: Estimates from Sample of Adult Males
Age at marriage 23.543 22.709 25.438 22.942 -0.834 1.895 -.601
(.380)∗∗ (.496)∗∗∗ (.315)∗
Years of schooling 3.781 2.870 3.314 3.189 -.911 -.467 -.592
(.238)∗∗∗ (.259)∗ (.209)∗∗∗
Number of male siblings 1.915 1.781 1.892 1.816 -.134 -.023 -.098
(.089) (.094) (.077)
Number of female siblings 2.111 1.980 1.935 2.071 -.131 -.177 -.041
(.086) (.090)∗ (.075)
Father ever attended school .105 .111 .086 .066 .006 -.020 -.039
(.018) (.019) (.015)∗∗
Father owns farmland .696 .675 .693 .738 -.022 -.003 .042
(.027) (.029) (.023)∗
Inherit or expect to inherit .590 .563 .608 .584 -.027 .018 -.006
property from parents (.029) (.031) (.025)
Table 1: Sample consists of married women (panel A) and married men (panel B) between the ages of 15 and 60.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 4A: Test of Negative Relationship Between Dowry and Social Distance
Dependent Variable: Man Received a Dowry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Married a ﬁrst-cousin -.0939 -.0807 -.0779 -.0750 -.0733
(.0242)∗∗∗ (.0203)∗∗∗ (.0203)∗∗∗ (.0203)∗∗∗ (.0203)∗∗∗
N 3799 3799 3799 3799 3799
R-squared .0039 .3126 .3156 .3199 .3218
F-statistic 15.0457 287.3912 158.7516 104.6165 85.3232
Panel B: Married other relative -.0860 -.0680 -.0638 -.0633 -.0627
(.0192)∗∗∗ (.0162)∗∗∗ (.0162)∗∗∗ (.0162)∗∗∗ (.0162)∗∗∗
N 4122 4122 4122 4122 4122
R-squared .0048 .3064 .3098 .3145 .317
F-statistic 20.0541 303.0065 167.7139 110.7331 90.6216
Panel C: Married non-relative in same village -.0167 -.0262 -.0276 -.0288 -.0285
(.0216) (.0181) (.0181) (.0180) (.0180)
N 4122 4122 4122 4122 4122
R-squared .0001 .3038 .3076 .3123 .3149
F-statistic .5968 299.2936 165.9858 109.6428 89.7497
Control Variables for Regressions in Panels A—C:
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Household Characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No No Yes
Table 4A: Notes: (i) Controls for individual characteristics include age, age-squared, years of schooling, attendance
at a religious school (dummy), and religion (dummy for muslim); (ii) Controls for parental characteristics include
mother’s schooling (dummy), father’s schooling (dummy), father’s ownership of farmland (dummy) and whether
parents were alive at the time of a woman’s marriage (dummy), the sex-ratio of parent’s children and the number
of sons alive at the time of a woman’s marriage; (iii) Controls for household characteristics include whether the
house has a dirt ﬂoor (dummy), a solid roof (dummy), the fraction of household members who have ever attended
a religious school, the mean years of education of all household members and the mean number of cousin marriages
among household members other than the woman and her husband (if applicable); (iv) Controls for Rainfall include
deviations from average rainfall when the woman was of marriageable age, i.e. she was between 11 and 15 years
old; (v) Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at
1% level.
31Table 4B: Test of Negative Relationship Between Dowry Levels and Social Distance
Dependent Variable: Log of Value of Dowry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Married a ﬁrst cousin -.2297 -.2332 -.2119 -.2156 -.2156
(.0748)∗∗∗ (.0746)∗∗∗ (.0773)∗∗∗ (.0773)∗∗∗ (.0773)∗∗∗
N 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411
R-squared .2856 .3123 .3413 .3454 .3454
F-statistic 9.4228 10.0115 6.8368 6.2314 6.2314
Panel B: Married any relative -.2370 -.2286 -.2249 -.2319 -.2319
(.0577)∗∗∗ (.0576)∗∗∗ (.0597)∗∗∗ (.0597)∗∗∗ (.0597)∗∗∗
N 1535 1535 1535 1535 1535
R-squared .288 .3134 .3403 .3444 .3444
F-statistic 16.8634 11.6976 7.9041 7.1726 7.1726
Panel C: Married non-relative in same village -.1538 -.2011 -.1883 -.1970 -.1970
(.0568)∗∗∗ (.0565)∗∗∗ (.0579)∗∗∗ (.0579)∗∗∗ (.0579)∗∗∗
N 1637 1616 1544 1543 1543
R-squared .2839 .3125 .3392 .3431 .3431
F-statistic 7.33 11.2813 7.6977 6.9699 6.9699
Control Variables for Regressions in Panels A—C:
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Household Characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No No Yes
Table 4B: Notes: (i) All regressions included year of marriage ﬁxed-eﬀects; Notes (i)–(v) of Table 4A apply.
32Table 5A: Test of the Relationship Between Consanguinous Marriage and Wealth
Dependent Variable: Married a Relative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Farmland Value (/106)
Farmland Value -.2263 -.3213 -.2936 -.2920
(.1463) (.1621)∗∗ (.1647)∗ (.1633)∗
Farmland Value Squared .2815 .3661 .3393 .3381
(.2024) (.2169)∗ (.2176) (.2173)
N 1376 1376 1376 1376
R-squared .0018 .0124 .0173 .0182
F-statistic 1.2094 4.5391 3.2989 2.7313
Panel B: Father Completed Primary School
Father completed primary school .0175 .0427 .0420 .0420
(.0252) (.0253)∗ (.0253)∗ (.0253)∗
N 2910 2910 2910 2910
R-squared .0002 .0176 .0213 .022
F-statistic .4849 10.4148 7.0201 5.4397
Control Variables for Regressions in Panels A and B:
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental, Household Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No Yes
Table 5A: Notes (i)–(v) of Table 4A apply.
Table 5B: Test of the Relationship Between Dowry and Wealth
Dependent Variable: Log of Value of Dowry (/104)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Father’s Farmland Value (/106)
Farmland Value .1975 .4666 .4531 .4642
(.2823) (.2753)∗ (.2658)∗ (.2668)∗
Farmland Value Squared -.4560 -.5485 -.5297 -.5417
(.2799) (.2828)∗ (.2844)∗ (.2862)∗
N 1293 1293 1293 1293
R-squared .2839 .3164 .3212 .3226
F-statistic 2.1621 9.133 6.4414 5.1231
Dependent Variable: Value of Dowry (/104)
Panel B: Father Completed Primary School
Father Completed Primary School .1522 .1402 .1401 .1409
(.0674)∗∗ (.0643)∗∗ (.0651)∗∗ (.0660)∗∗
N 1053 1053 1053 1053
R-squared .2218 .2833 .2855 .2873
F-statistic 5.1023 6.1556 3.5938 2.8719
Control Variables for Regressions in Panels A and B
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental, Household Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No Yes
Table 5B: Notes: (i) Regressions in panel B control for year of marriage ﬁxed eﬀects; Notes (i)–(v) of Table 4A
apply.
33Table 6A: Test of the Relationship Between Cousin-Marriage and Age At Marriage
Dependent Variable: Married a Cousin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age at Marriage -.0067 -.0059 -.0057 -.0056
(.0024)∗∗∗ (.0026)∗∗ (.0026)∗∗ (.0026)∗∗
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental, Household Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No Yes
Decade of Marriage Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2460 2460 2460 2460
R-squared .0031 .0214 .0244 .0247
F-statistic 7.5349 66.0518 35.8306 26.7884
Table 6A: Notes: Notes (i)–(v) of Table 4A apply.
Table 6B: Test of the Relationship Between Dowry and Age At Marriage
OLS Results IV Results
Dependent Variable: Value of Dowry (/104) Second Stage First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age at Menarche .6481
(.0317)∗∗∗
Age at Marriage .0317 .0114 .0112 .0111 .0141
(.0026)∗∗∗ (.0027)∗∗∗ (.0027)∗∗∗ (.0027)∗∗∗ (.0065)∗∗
Controls for Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Parental, Household Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Rainfall at Marriageable Age No No No Yes Yes Yes
Decade of Marriage Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2702 2702 2702 2702 2702 2702
R-squared .0211 .2893 .2908 .2909 .282 .1036
F-statistic 58.234 135.3083 75.8956 57.1396 63.8779 18.2484
Table 6B: Notes: (i) In the IV regressions, Age at Marriage was the instrumented variable and Age at Menarche
was the instrument; Notes (i)–(v) of Table 4A apply;
34